Tactical Groupings - Reducing Command Teams while Growing the Primary Reserves

The Canadian Army (CA) is beginning to move out on its "Inflection Point 2025" plan across the Army.  The stated purpose of this reinvigoration is to have the CA and its elements become more operationally focussed.  In a "Command Intent" centric led military that the CAF purports itself to be, sometimes the delta between Commander's intent and execution can be the difference between success and failure.

Recently, in accordance with Inflection Point 2025, the CA is being restructured at the Divisional level and below.  For all meaningful purposes, this reorganizes the majority of units of the Primary Reserve under the Domestic Operations Division that will be Headquartered in Quebec.  Currently CA P Res units answer to Canadian Brigade Groups (CBG's) who report to Regional divisional HQ's across the country.  The restructure will necessarily have Reserve CBGs all reporting to one Div HQ once the transformation is complete.  Definitely a tall order for span of control for units spread from St John's, NL to Vancouver Island, BC and as far North as the Arctic with the inclusion of the Canadian Rangers.

As an interim measure, CBG's across the country have been assessing the Commander Canadian Army (CCA)'s intent of Tactical Grouping (Tac Gp) where necessary to achieve operational focus.  The application of this intent has not been in any standardized way by various in-place Divisional Commanders and CBG Commanders.  Some Divisional/CBG commands have applied a more rigorous Tac Gp where possible approach as opposed to Tac Gp where necessary as stated Comd intent. 

The tactical effect this initiative has produced is grouping units of differing cultures, extended geographical locations and sometimes even different trades under one Command Team (Commanding Officer and Regimental Sergeant Major) who are expected to manage various competing priorities on a part-time basis while maintaining civilian professions and family demands.

Early results of this Tac Gp concept seem to indicate a higher level of burn out for these Command Teams, reduced unit esprit-de-corps over Regimental identity and loss of connection with the supporting communities that Reserve units are nestled into.

The real question at this time of operational focus combined with a stated intent of growing the Primary Reserves is why would be now reduce Command Team presence at the very levels where the units will be expected to operate in the new CA construct.  Certainly, reducing the reporting chain to just one Division HQ for all CA P Res unit generates an issue of "span of control" at the Div and CBG levels; however, given the intent to increase both P Res personnel and impose on them a higher expectation to conduct operations, the local command teams will be the key leadership elements that will make the difference for a successful outcome.  These Command Teams need to be part of the communities they will lead their citizen soldiers in.  Not be geographically and culturally distant from where the soldiers will need to operate.